Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

the opportunity of testifying here. Like the other witnesses, I feel

this is a very important subject to cover but I would like to touch

on only a few issues in my written testimony.

Let me begin by saying that I agree with the previous witnesses

that Iran is a country where we have some real options and possibilities.

However, I may be less optimistic about internal developments

in Iran. I have sat through quite a number of informal discussions

with Iranians and Iranian officials. I am struck by the fact

that over the years I do not see that those who I would regard as

moderates or the supporters of President Khatami becoming more confident.

I think there is great concern about the tensions within Iran on

the part of many of those that I have dealt with. I am very uncertain

as to whether Iran is prepared to full, formal dialog with the

United States today. It may be. But time and again, Iranians have

privately said that—until the issues and tensions between the various

factions in Iran are resolved—there are many things we might

do to move toward an informal dialog but they are not prepared to

confront the issues of a formal dialog.

I too, like Deputy Secretary Armitage, served in Iran in the early

1970s. I too watched the Shah engage in a nuclear program, and

I watched the Shah lie about it. And I watched reports emerge in

the U.S. of imports of technology ranging from laser isotope separation

technology to other weapons oriented technologies that bore no

resemblance to a peaceful nuclear program. As a result, I do not

believe that getting today’s Iran to stop an overt program will really

stop its nuclear program, and I think we can count on Iran to

try to obfuscate and lie about that.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you talked about super inspections. I am

not sure what those really are. I am not sure that it is easy to do

more than UNSCOM and UNMOVIC did in Iraq, and they obviously

failed. They could not characterize that effort.

I think we are learning that there are deep problems in the U.S.

intelligence effort and in our coverage of proliferation. Iraq is only

a case example, and I would hope at some point either the Senate

Intelligence Committee or this committee fully examines our capability

to characterize proliferation.

I do not believe that we will ever have the capability to be able

to determine whether Iran pursues a research and development

strategy as distinguished from an overt production of fissile material.

Looking at the IAEA reports, I believe Iran could conceal R&D

efforts in the development of reactor technology, that they could

create a mature centrifuge capability far more sophisticated than

the one they have in terms of centrifuge design, that they could

proceed with many aspects of nuclear weapons design, and that no

amount of inspection or intelligence coverage could, with confidence,

detect that effort if it was dispersed and concealed and did

not go into advanced development.

I would also note that this is a country that has stated it has

chemical weapons and which may well have biological weapons. A

focus on one form of proliferation may be dangerous, particularly

when it is far from clear to what threat Iran’s long-range missiles

could pose with conventional warheads, except as psychological

weapons. The Shahab frankly has to have a motive other than

dropping 1,000 kilograms of high explosives as an area weapon on

an enemy. Having said that, I do agree that we should move toward

dialog and toward discussion.

I would also have to reinforce a point that has been made in this

hearing. I was in Iran when the MEK murdered American officials.

One of the people I was working with, Colonel Louis Hawkins, was

shot down in front of his family by the MEK. I have followed their

actions over the years. They are a sophisticated lobbying body with

many democratic fronts. They also were a tool of Iraq, a cult of

their leaders, and they pursued a policy of murdering and assassination

against Iranian officials, which is well documented in the

State Department reports. I do not believe this is a movement we

can tolerate or encourage.

I would also have to say that whatever we do we should stay as

far away from the Shah’s son as possible. I saw little redeeming

about his Imperial Majesty when I was in Iran. If the Bunyaads

are corrupt today, I can remember my wife going to an orphanage

supposedly supported by the Pahlavi Foundation and finding out

the Pahlavi Foundation took the money and kept it, and it was the

wives of American and British diplomats who kept the orphanage

going with their money. This is not in any sense the successor regime that is needed in Iran.

Now, let me make a few final points about recommendations. We

must not forget that whatever we do, we have to maintain a strong

military position in the gulf to contain Iran. It is one of the ironies

of our action in Iraq that it has not altered the need for containment

and possibly not even altered the level of containment that is required.

I would also say that labeling Iran as the leading nation supporting

terrorism, or part of an ‘‘axis of evil,’’ is the worst possible

way to influence the Iranian people. If we have things to say about

terrorism, identify specific actions, identify specific groups, and

seek specific goals. I think our rhetoric on Iran illustrates a broad

problem in American policy. We speak in terms of domestic politics

to American audiences in ways which undermine our credibility in

Iran, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the rest of the world.

As we deal with Iran, I also have to strongly endorse what Senator

Biden said about the need for as much informal dialog as possible.

I would also endorse the point that we had a semi-official dialog

with Iran and we broke it off in dealing with Iraq. That was

a mistake. It served no interest of our own, not only in dealing with Iran, but with Afghanistan.

I would be cautious, however, about the nature of European cooperation.

I have had many discussions with Europeans and many

have criticized their own approach to the problem, as well as ours.

Perhaps one of the best statements about Europe’s approach to

critical dialog was that, ‘‘we have a tendency to be all dialog and

no critical.’’ If we are going to rely on Europe to deal with the problem

of nuclear weapons in Iran, it is going to require intense pressure.

Let me also say that this committee should, as it moves forward,

also reconsider the sanctions policy we have. I thought the legislation

that led to ILSA was stupid in terms of the original proposal.

I thought it was stupid when it was passed, and I think it is stupid

now. Its net effect is not to alter proliferation or the military buildup.

It is to ensure that American business and American commerce

cannot work with Iranians to create barriers to contact with people

who are moderate Iranians. The end result is precisely what we do

not need, to reinforce the views of extremists and hard-liners. If we

need sanctions, they should lie in dual use technology and limits

on arms sales. The sanctions we have today are precisely the sanctions

we do not need.

Finally, in terms of the Arab-Israeli issue, if we are ever to reach

a modus vivendi with Iran, if we are to get them to stop support

of Hamas or the Hezbollah, we have to demonstrate that we have

an unremitting support for a peace process so strong and convincing

that every possible effort is being made regardless of

delays, problems, and reversals. If the United States cannot demonstrate

it is doing that, I frankly do not know how we go to the

Arab world and Iran and say, stop supporting Hamas, Hezbollah,

and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Thank you.

I think that, Senator, you raise one of the most

critical issues in nonproliferation, that compellance by itself will

never succeed. You have to remove or ease the motive to proliferate.

Bob Einhorn raised the critical issue, that if you can control the

fuel cycle, you greatly limit the ability of a country to proliferate.

Even today folded centrifuge systems are going to be relatively

large and visible. While laser isotope separation presents a different

problem, it is far from clear that countries can actually develop

that technology in the near term.

I think that you can have success if you can couple changes in

their motive to proliferate with controls on the most overt acts—

the fuel cycle, the testing of a nuclear weapon, and the deployment

of vehicles designed to carry weapons of mass destruction, like

long-range missiles, particularly systems which make no military

sense unless they have weapons of mass destruction, than you can

address the most visible signs.

But we need to be honest, and perhaps this is an area where the

committee might wish to seek a classified response. With today’s

technology, it is becoming easier and easier to develop relatively sophisticated

nuclear weapons designs without overt testing. Basic

research for laser isotope separation is in my opinion undetectable,

and moving it forward to the possibility of industrial scale development

would probably also be undetectable. Advances in centrifuge

design could be dispersed and concealed and brought to the point

of a breakout capability in ways I do not believe we can detect. As

long as these realities exist, you cannot really talk about preventing

proliferation. What you can talk about is altering the path

in intensity of proliferation, and that is a different thing.

Senator, could I just make two quick points?

First, my own dialog or discussions with Iranians do not indicate

that the presence we have in the gulf, assuming we are out of Iraq,

is by itself something that they cannot live with. I think it is something

they would like to get rid of, but they can accept it and they

expect it to continue. The problem lies in U.S. rhetoric which talks

about regime change and preemption, which is not backed by dialog,

compromise, or efforts to move forward. That we can change.

But the second thing that bothers me is that because a nation

supports groups we do not like, it somehow is going to be a high

risk in terms of the transfer of weapons of mass destruction.

I think the problem is different and more serious in many ways.

Terrorist groups already know how to make crude chemical weapons.

Fourth generation technology will ease the burden with time.

The proliferation of biotechnology, the components for biological

weapons, additional knowledge of genetic engineering is not an urgent

or immediate threat, but the anthrax problems we saw in the

U.S. show that the advanced technology for building anthrax already

exists and no terrorist movement is not going to be able to

build crude biological weapons.

It does not need Iran or anyone else. Radiological weapons are

probably not very effective, but all you need to do is buy the agent.

So the idea that weapons of mass destruction can be kept out of

terrorist hands or that it takes a state sponsor to provide these

weapons to terrorists is one for which I can see no technological base.

I think, Senator, if I may say, one of the problems

here is that a number of times people are encouraged to have

informal dialog with Iranian officials, but they are also encouraged

not to discuss it in any way. So we have a——

I think some senior Iranian officials have talked

to Americans outside the United States.

Senator, I do not have an idealized picture of

Iran. It is a nation where our relations do require pressure and the

presence of a big stick. I think that we have to be in a position to

keep that up. But I would have to agree with you. I think we have

provided recently the wrong kinds of pressure, that we have tended

to demonize Iran rather than to try to influence it or to create a

dialog. We have made it into a political symbol which has weakened

its moderates and strengthened its hard-liners rather than influenced

and changed its behavior. A lot of that is a matter of posture

and rhetoric rather than things which we could not have avoided.

I do have to say, incidentally, if I may go back, that it is my impression

that we had not multilateral but de facto unilateral dialog

with Iran on the issue of Afghanistan, that U.S. officials met with

Iran on the issue of Iraq, and were instructed to halt those negotiations

before the war, and that we have been able to talk about narcotics,

and that we have not been unable to discuss some of the

issues that Bob raised on a bilateral basis, but that we have reinforced

just the problems you mentioned at the cost of constructive

dialog and with almost universally negative results.

No, Senator. I do not know if all of us would

agree with that, but I think the problems we have in Iraq would

be an order of magnitude greater were we to attempt a military adventure

in Iran. Not only that, if we were to actually do that in

yet another country, in the face of no support from within the region

or from our allies, the reputation and status of the United

States as a world power would be in jeopardy for reasons that go

far beyond the military problems in Iran.